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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VII NOVEMBER, 1932 NUMBER 3
PROVABILITY OF CLAIMS FOR FUTURE RENT FOR
DAMAGES AGAINST A TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
OR A RECEIVER OF AN INSOLVENT TENANT UPON
ABANDONMENT OF THE LEASED PREMISES, MEAS-
URE OF DAMAGES IN FEDERAL COURT RECEIVER-
SHIPS.
1. INTRODUCTORY NoTE.
The large number of insolvency proceedings during the present
economic period throws into relief two legal problems of vital
importance to the landlord and the general creditors of the tenant.
May the landlord prove a claim against the insolvent tenant's
estate for the loss of future rent, or for damages due to the aband-
onment of the lease upon the insolvency of the tenant, and if such
a claim is provable, what is the measure of damages? These prob-
lems are acute because of the present extreme deflation in rental
values where the involvent's lease has an unexpired term of many
years at fixed rentals which in amount may be double the present
rental value of the same premises for the balance of the term.
A considerable number of chain stores1 and other enterprises
operating in many states have resorted to receiverships, partially
at least to mitigate the high rent factor in their fixed operating
cost through the disaffirmance of leases by the receiver. In the
end the business is often returned to the same hands from which
the receiver took it. Receivership frequently serves as a method of
reorganization.2 The courts have thus, in many instances, served as
a clearing house of the depression, where old liabilities and fixed
charges are liquidated and deflated in an orderly way under the
sanction of the law, by a pro rata distribution of assets (i. e., the
present deflated market value of the assets) to creditors of the
estate in the receiver's hands. How does the landlord fare in these
proceedings?
1 See Bulletin No. 10, Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Oct. 1932, p. 333,
"The Rent Cost Deflation"- Business Week for Oct. 5, 1932. Examples of
receivership: United Cigar Stores Cm., 900 retail cigar stores; Whelan
Drug Co., over 200 stores; F & W Grand 5-10-25c Stores, Hartman Fur-
niture d Carpet Co.
2 See Note 1, and 45 Harv. L. R. 1394, "Reorganization, Consolidation
and Sale."
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II. CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY AND IN RECEIVERSIanp
It may be noted at the outset that a claim for damages filed by
a landlord under the Bankruptcy Act 3 upon the abandonment of
leased premises by the trustee of the tenant, is not provable in
bankruptcy 4 even though an attempt be made to provide in the
lease for termination thereof upon the bankruptcy of the tenant,
and for the allowance of a fixed sum in liquidation of damages.,
This conclusion is based upon the common law rule that rent
proceeds from the soil and is not earned until occupancy is en-
joyed." Future rentals not being due, no debt is deemed to have
been owing at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and therefore no claim can be proved.7  The result is that the
bankrupt remains bound by the lease, and as to it is not dis-
charged,8 a result which works hardship on both lessor and lessee,
and is only to the advantage of the creditors of the lessee, whose
pro rata shares on distribution of assets are naturally increased
3 Section 63 (a) (4) Title 11, Sec. 103 (a) (4) U. S. Code Ann., Debts of
the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against the estate which are (4)
founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied,
(b) unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may, pursuant to applica-
tion to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall direct, and may
thereafter be proved and allowed against the estate.
'In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed 667 (C. C. A. 2, 1911) Watson v. Merrill,
136 Fed. 359, 69 A. L. R. 719 (C. C. A. 8 1905) Wells v. 21st Street Realty
Co. 12 F (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6 1926) In re McAllister Maher Co. 46 F (2d)
91 (D. C. Ohio 1930) In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57 (1907) McDonnell v. Woods
298 Fed. 434 (C. C. A. 1 1924) In re Goldberg, 52 F (2d) 156 (D. C. N. Y.
1931) In re Service Appliance Co., 45 F (2d) 884 (D. C. N. Y. 1930).
'See R. C. Taylor Trust Co. v. Kothe, 30 F (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 1, 1929),
where provision in a lease for liquidated damages was sustained by the
Circuit Court. (Discussed in 38 Yale L. J. 985, 42 Harv. L. R. 951) The
decision was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court on the grounds that
the provision was prejudicial to creditors of the bankrupt and unen-
forceable in bankruptcy See Justice McReynold's decision in Kothe v.
Taylor Trust Co. 280 U. S. 224, 74 L. Ed. 382, (1930).
'Coke on Littleton, 292 (b) Bordman v. Osborn, 23 Pick. 295 (Mass.)
(1839) Gardner v. Butler 245 U. S. 603, 62 L. Ed. 505 (1918). In Central
Trust Co. v Chscago Auditormm Assn., 240 U. S. 581, 60 L. Ed. 811, (1915)
the Supreme Court distinguished a claim for breach of an executory con-
tract from a case wherein a landlord's claim for damages on abandonment
of a lease is sought to be proved, "Cases of the latter class are distin-
guished because of the 'diversity' between duties which touch the realty
and the mere personalty."
7 What appears to be an exception to this rule is found in In re Mull-
tngs, 238 Fed. 59 (C. C. A. 2, 1916), where dissolution proceedings caused a
repudiation of the lease before the lessee entered into possession and
before petition in bankruptcy was filed, and the lessor was allowed to
prove a claim for the difference between the rent reserved and the
rental value of the premises. The court distinguished the case from
ordinary bankruptcy where the lessee is not discharged and reversed the
District Court, which had disallowed the claim in accordance with the
general rule 230 Fed. 681 (D. C. Conn., 1916).
'In re Goldberg, supra, Note 4.
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by the absence of the landlord's clan. This result has been much
criticized.9
A receiver, like a trustee in bankruptcy, has power to adopt or
abandon an existing lease." But in receivership cases the courts
are not confronted with the statutory limitations which arise in
bankruptcy As stated by Air. Justice Holmes in Filene's Sons Co.
v. Weed," where a claim against a receiver was sustained upon the
basis of an agreed measure of damages in the lease, namely the
difference between the rent reserved and the rental value of the
premises.
"When a statutory system is administered the only ques-
tion for the courts is what the statutes prescribe. But
when the courts without statute take possession of all the
assets of a corporation under a bill like the present and so
make it impossible to collect debts except from the court's
hands, they have no warrant for excluding creditors, or
for introducing supposed equities other than those deter-
mined by the contracts that the debtor was content to make
and the creditors to accept. In order to make a distribu-
tion possible they must of necessity limit the time for the
proof of the claims. But they have no authority to give
to the filing of the bill the effect of the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy so as to exclude any previously made and
lawful claim that matures within a reasonable time before
distribution can be made."
In the absence of a "statutory system" in administering receiv-
erships, resulting in wide divergence of opinion among federal courts
regarding the provability of claims for damages for disaffirmance
of a lease by the receiver,' 2 many courts disallow such claims, not
on the grounds stated in the bankruptcy cases, but because the
damages are said to be speculative and conjectural and incapable
OSee "Amendment to Bankruptcy Act," McLaughlin, 40 Harv. L. R.(1927) 583,608; "The Provability Against Insolvent Estate of the Land-
lord's Claim for Future Rent", 41 Harv. L. R. 894. The U. S. Sup. Ct.
has allowed proof of a claim for anticipatory breach of an executory
contract in Central Trust Co. v. hceago Auditortum Assn., supra, Note 6,
following Boehm v. lBorst, 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953, (1899) and there
would seem to be no reason in principle why damages for breach of a
lease should not be provable aside from the reasons stated by the Supreme
Court m Gardner v. Butler supra, Note 6: "But the law as to leases is
not a matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of history that has not for-
gotten Lord Coke." This reason would seem to apply more correctly in
states where the common law rule is strictly in force, such as Ohio and
Massachusetts In re Sermce Appliance Co., supra, Note 4, Filene's Sons
Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 603, 62 L. Ed. 505 (1918).
20 Pa. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City By. Co., 198 Fed. 721 (1912) Sunflower
Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313, 332, 35 L. Ed. 1025, 1028, (1892).
u Cited in Note 9.
"A number of decisions deny the right of the receiver to abrogate a
lease by disaffirmance and hold the lessee bound by the lease. See New
York etc. v. New York L. E. & W R. Co. 58 Fed 268, (1893) Detroit
d T. S. L. R. Co. v. Detroit T. & L BR. Co. 280 Fed. 549, (1923).
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of that certainty of proof which the law requires. 3 We should,
therefore, determine whether the federal courts will follow the
state law in passing upon the landlord's claims, and if so, what
the law of Washington is relative thereto.
III. WHAT LAw CONTROLS IN FEDERAL COURT RECEIVERSHIPS,
MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNDER WASHINGTON DECISIONS.
Clearly "in trials at common law" the federal court will follow
the state court's decision where the treaties, constitutions or
statutes of the United States do not conflict, but the provision
of the judicial code cited below14 does not affect the federal court
sitting as a court of equity However, where the action is purely
local in character and invokes a rule of property within the state,
the federal courts will follow the decismons of state courts, in a
court of equity as well as in a court of law 15 Even in cases arising
under the federal bankruptcy statutes, a rule of law adopted by
the state courts as to the relations of landlord and tenant under
a lease of property within the state, is adhered to.16 Federal courts
will likewise follow the state courts' decision in determining the
measure of damages and the provability of a claim upon disaffirm-
ance of a lease by a receiver. It was so held by Judge Tuttle in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Northern Division, in the case of Leo v. Pearce Stores Co.', in
21Pa. Steel Co. v. N. Y City By. Co., supra, Note 10, Circuit Judge
Noyes said, at page 759 (198 Fed.) "Who could foretell the results
of operation by the owner, the growth of the city, improvements m
motive power, or reductions in cost? Who could foresee whether a lease
could be made to another railroad company or the terms thereof? The
whole matter of future damages was and still is a matter of conjecture
and guess work. The claim for such damages was properly disallowed
because it was uncertain in amount and there was no method of making
it certain. Pacific States Corp. v. Resenshne, 113 Cal. App. 266, 298 Pac.
155 (1931). See Comment in Vol. XV Cal. L. Rev. Sept., 1932, page 622.
11 Title 28, §725, U. S. C. A.
'Mason v. U. S,. 260 U. S. 545, 67 L. Ed. 396, at 401 (1923) "Here,
while the suit is one in equity the statute and decisions relied upon have
nothing to do with the general principles of equity or with the federal
equity jurisdiction, but simply establish a measure of damages applicable
alike to actions at law and suits in equity. The case presented by the
bills is primarily one involving title to land, and seeking an injunction
against continuing trespasses. The conversion of the oil, for which
damages are sought, is incidental and dependent. The entire cause of
action is therefore local." However, in the absence of a rule of decision
in the state courts, or in the case of conflicting opinions, the Supreme
Court has said in Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458,
69 L. Ed. 1050 (1925) "Both the meaning of statutes of a state and
the rules of the unwritten law of a state affecting property within the
state are peculiarly questions of local courts."
"6In re McAlister-MohZer Co., 46 F (2d) 91, at 95 (1930) the court
said: "I am bound willy-nilly by the decision of our circuit court of
appeals on the question of the application of the common law rule as to
leases in the State of Ohio, * * * " In re Service Appliance Co., Inc., sitpra,
Note 4. "This court must follow the Massachilsetts cases."
. 54 Fed. (2d) 92 (1931).
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which a receiver for the Pearce Stores Company had been ap-
pointed, and shortly thereafter a considerable number of leases
on business property m the State of Michigan were disaffirmed by
the receiver. Jpon the filing of clains as provided by the District
Court, the question discussed herein arose and the court said in
respect to the law of the case:
"The decisions of the courts upon this question are in
conflict. The courts of some states and of the federal
courts sitting in such states deny, while in other states
they sustain, the provability of such damages. There is
no occasion here to analyze the various arguments and
decisions presented in this connection or to determine
their relative merits, because I reach the conclusion that
the question involved is one of local law on which the fed-
eral court will follow the rule adopted by the courts of
the particular state where the leasehold premises in ques-
tion are situated. (Cases cited.) As, therefore, the prop-
erty here involved is located in Michigan and the leases
under consideration are Michigan leases, this court in
determining this question will apply the law as established
by the court of last resort of that state."
The court then went on to point out that such claims were prov-
able under the law of Michigan, following McGraw v. Unwtn Trust
Co.18 in which the landlord was allowed to prove a claim for dam-
ages against a receiver upon abandonment of a five-year lease with
an unexpired term of approximately two years. The landlord
succeeded in reletting the prenses after several months, for the
balance of the term at a lower rent than that designated in the
original lease. He filed and sought to prove a claim for the dif-
ference between the rent reserved and the rental secured under
the new lease. The court said.
"The rule appears to be that a receiver may elect
whether he will take over and assume, or discard and
disavow, outstanding leases of the insolvent party The
receiver will naturally take over leased premises which are
profitable, and will also seek to surrender leases unprof-
itable to the tenant, but profitable to the landlord. For
this reason the lessor is allowed to himself re-rent the
premises, and if there is a deficiency arising out of such
re-renting, such amount is a provable claim. * * * There
is nothing contingent about the claim of the petitioners.
Their claim is absolute. The rent accruing down to March
1, 1903, is absolute and fixed, and the loss of the remaining
fourteen months became fixed and absolute when the
Malcomson lease was entered into."
What, then, is the law of Washington in respect to the lessor's
13135 Mich. 609, 98 N. W 390 (1904).
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right of recovery 9 In Dutton v. Christse,'5 it was held that a deposit
made in pursuance of the lease to be applied on the last two
months' rent in the event of faithful performance, was consider-
ation for the lease and could be retained on abandonment of the
premises by the tenant, and in Barrett v. Munro,20 where a five-
year lease was terminated before two years had elapsed, the lessor's
right to a deposit of $1,200 was sustained as liquidated damages.21
The court said, at page 232
"It is manifest that the parties agreed upon liquidated
damages because their exact measurement could not be
readily ascertained."
If the lease contained a provision for liquidated damages, no
greater amount can be proved,2 2 but in the absence of a provision
for liquidated damages the Supreme Court of Washington has
followed the weight of authority 23 by permitting the landlord to
prove the difference between the rent reserved in the lease and the
rental value of the premises for the balance of the term, as the
measure of his recovery
In the case of Oldfield v. Angeles Brewzng & Maltng Co.,24 the
parties had entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed
to erect a building on the premises owned by him, and upon com-
pletion thereof, to lease the same to the defendant for five years.
The agreement was in the form of a lease and the premises were to
be used for a saloon. Before completion of the building, a law
was passed forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors within 300
feet of any state armory The plaintiff's building was within the
19 63 Wash. 372, 115 Pac. 856 (1911).
69 Wash. 229, 124 Pac. 369 (1912)
"See Stern v. Green, 127 Wash. 429, 221 Pac. 601 (1923) where the de-
posit of a liberty bond is distinguished from the above deposit.
22 Smith v. Lambert Transfer Co., 109 Wash. 529; 187 Pac. 326 (1920)
Pacific & Puget Sound Bottling Co. v. Clithero, 162 Wash. 156, 298 Pac.
316, (1931).
2California: Imperial Water Co. No. 8 v. Cameron, 67 Cal. App. 591,
228 Pac. 678 (1924) Silva v. Bair -141 Cal. 599, 75 Pac. 162 (1904)
Bradbury v. Higginson, 162 Cal. 602, 123 Pac. 797 (1912). Kansas: Wilson
v. National Refinsng Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 Pac. 941 (1928) Post v. Davis,
Kan. App. 217, 52 Pac. 903 (1898) Idaho: Porter v. Allen, 81 Ida. 358,
69 Pac. 105, (1902). Texas: Smith v. Irwsn Ct. of Civil App. of Tex.
289 S. W 113 (1926) Dulin v. Knechtel, Ct. of Civil App. of Tex., 51 S. W
350 (1899) South Carolina. Burkhelter v. Townsend, 139 S. C. 324, 138
S. E. 34 (1927) Simon v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S. C. 251, 139 S. E. 614 (1927)
North Carolina: Monger v. Lutterlok, 195 N. C. 274, 142 S. E. 12 (1928).
Michigan, Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 F (2d) 340, (1932) McGraw v.
Union Trust Co. 135 Mich. 609, 98 N. W 390, (1904) Illinois: Smith v.
Goodman, 149 Ill. 75, 36 N. E. 621, (1893) Chemscal Nat. Bank v. Hartford
Deposit Co., 156 Ill. 522, 41 N. E. 225 (1895). Pennsylvania. In re Read-
ing Iron Works 150 Pa. 369, 24 Atl. 617, (1892). New Jersey- Bolles v.
Crescent Drug Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 614, 32 Atl. 1061 (1895) New York:
People v. St. Nicholas Bank of N Y., 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897).2162 Wash. 260, 263, 113 Pac. 630 (1911)
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prohibition of the statute. As the defendant refused to take
possession, the relation of landlord and tenant never arose. The
plaintiff brought suit, founding his action on a claim for rent up
to the time of filing suit, and was given judgment therefor below.
In reversing the lower court the Supreme Court said.
" I * the great weight of authority is to the effect
that the true measure of damages, for failure to take
possession, is the difference between the amount stip-
ulated in the contract and the sum for which the prenises
would rent to other parties during the stipulated term,
and in this connection the rule is the same as in leases
or agreements to lease. * * ' There is but one breach, and
there should be but one recovery for that breach."
Upon retrial of the case, plaintiff failed to amend the complaint,
which was still founded on a claim for rent, and over the objection
of the defendant was permitted to prove the difference between
the rent reserved in the lease and the rental value of the premises.
The case was again appealed to the Supreme Court,2 5 where the
court again reversed the lower court on the ground that the allega-
tions in the complaint did not permit such proof.2 6 The case was
then tried for the third time wth proper amendments to the com-
plaint, and the plaintiff in endeavoring to prove damages sought
to show the rental value of the premises for the balance of the
term, from period to period, that is, from April, 1909, to April,
1910, etc. This was held to be error and the lower court was again
reversed, the Supreme Court saying.
" 0 0 S the question to be tried was this, Was the rental
value of the premises for the term, that is for five years, in
April, 1909, of greater or less value than the rent reserved
in the lease? If the former, the respondent was not dam-
aged, if the latter, his damage was the difference between
the two amounts to be fixed at the time the breach occurred.
That this is the true measure of damages is the logic of
both of these cases. It is also the rule supported by the
great weight of authority "27
This series of decisions defines clearly the measure of damages
for refusal to take possession of leased premises, and the Supreme
Court stated in its first decision that the same measure of dam-
ages would be applied whether or not the tenant had entered into
possession. Any academic doubts which might have arisen on this
"72 Wash. 168, 129 Pac. 1098 (1913).
The appointment of a receiver for the defendant company before the
second appeal, did not affect the cause of action. It may be inferred in
passing that the plaintiff's judgment would be paid out of assets m the
hands of the receiver, that is, by sharing in the pro rata distribution to
creditors, although this does not appear in the decision.
"2177 Wash. 158, 160, 137 Pac. 469 (1913).
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point, due to the fact that no relation of landlord and tenant existed
in the Oldfield case, supra, were dispelled by the decision in Brown
v. Hayes (1916), 92 Wash. 300,28 in which the rule of the Oldfield
case was applied in an action by the lessor on abandonment of
premises by the tenant, the court saying.
"It is just as well established as is the general rule that,
when a tenant abandons the premises without just cause
and refuses to pay rent, the landlord may either treat
the term as still subsisting and sue for the installments
of rent reserved as they accrue, or, treating the lease as
terminated by the tenant's breach, re-enter and sue for
damages for the breach. * -  If the landlord pursues the
latter course, his damages are measured, not by the amount
of the rent reserved, but by the difference between that
amount and the rental value of the premises to the end of
the term."
There is as yet no decision squarely in point in Washington like
that of McGraw v. Unon Trust Co., supra, in Michigan, which
applies the measure of damages of the foregoing decisions to the
proof of a claim for disaffirmance of a lease by the receiver. 29 It
could scarcely be contended, however, that the court would refuse
to apply this measure of damages to proof of a claim in receiver-
ship. As stated in McGraw v. Union Trust Co.
"The bank had the right to make the lease when it did,
and had it continued in business and abandoned the prem-
ises, and the lessor, in accordance with the terms of the
lease, had re-entered and re-let the premises at a loss,
there could be no question but the lessor would have a
remedy over against the bank. The following cases-and
we think they are in accord with the weight of authorities
-recognize the same right in the lessor where the prem-
21 92 Wash. 300, 302, 159 Pac. 89 (1916) The question of whether or
not the landlord has accepted the surrender of the premises, or whether
or not surrender by operation of law is present, thus terminating any
right which the landlord might have had to recover against the tenant,
is usually present in cases of this sort and is discussed in Brown V. Hayes.
This matter is beyond the scope of this article, although vital in the
landlord's action against the tenant. See: Notes 3, A. L. R. 1080; 52 A-
L. R. 154, L. R. A. 1917A 208; Martin v. SetgleV 123 Wash. 683, 212 Pac.
1057, (1923) Washington Securities Co. v. Oppenheimer & Co. 163 Wash.
338, 1 Pac. (2d) 236, (1931)
"In the case of Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Fredenthal, 124 Wash. 682, 215
Pac. 19 (1923) a lessor was permitted to retain a deposit of $380 against
the contention of the tenant's receiver that it should be applied against
rental due for the period of the tenant's and the receiver's occupancy.
It was the lessor's contention that the $380 equalled the difference be-
tween the rent reserved in the lease and the amount for which he was
able to rent the premises to another tenant. This position was impliedly
sustained, but no authorities are cited and the case is not carefully con-
sidered.
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ises are vacated because of the insolvency of the corpora-
tion and the appointment of a receiver * ** ',8O
It is submitted then that a clann for damages by a landlord upon
disaffirmance of a lease by a tenant's receiver can be proved in
Washigton, and that the measure of damages is the difference
between the rent reserved in the lease and the rental value of the
premises for the balance of the term."'
It is submitted that the same measure of damages would be ap-
plied in the proof of a claim m the federal court upon disaffirm-
ance of a federal receiver of a lease of property within the State
of Washington, as held by Judge Tuttle in Leo v. Pearce Stores
Co., supra.
IV MFASURE op DAMyAGES DURING TIM "DEPRESsIoN."
Having determined what is believed to be the logic of this matter,
we refer again to the introductory note of this article, and recall
the almost unprecedented deflation of rental values confronting us
today In the Oldfield ease, supra, damages were proved for a
period of five years, in the McGraw and Brown cases, supra, for
shorter periods, but what would be the effect of applying the same
measure of damages m a receivership proceeding where the re-
ceiver has disaffirmed, let us say, a twenty-year lease on property
which we shall assume was rented for $1,000 a month for the full
term? The lease has been disaffirmed. The rental value of the
premises may now be $500 a month or less, such depreciation being
not at all unusual. 2 The landlord must then be allowed a claim
amounting to $500 a month for twenty years, or a total of $120,000,
a suggestion which would leave general creditors somewhat aghast.
A few claims of this size against the receiver would eat up the
assets and reduce the pro rata distribution to general creditors to
-135 Mich. 609, 68 N. W 390, 392 (1904). The court cited the follow-
ing decisions: People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129;
Reading Iron Works, 150 Pa. 369. 24 Atl. 617 People v. Nat. Trust Co.,
82 N. Y. 283; Chemical Bank v. Deposit Go., 156 Ill. 522, 41 N. E. 225,
Bofles v. Crescent Drug Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 614, 32 Atl. 1061. See Note 19
above. See also Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 62 N. W 1024 (1895) (Minn.) Minne-
apolis Baseball Co. v. City Bank, 76 N. W 1024 (1898) (Minn.)
3 It would seem that the proof of the rental value of the premises for
the balance of the term could be most firmly established by showing a
bona fide lease to a new tenant for the full term, as in McGraw v. lUnwn
Trust Co., supra, but in the absence of a lease, expert testimony as to the
rental value for the balance of the term is apparently authorized by
OlZfel7 v. Angeles Breunng & Malting Co., supra, although not expressly
mentioned by the court. No lease was introduced and the plaintiff ap-
parently relied upon expert testimony.
3 The writer has recently attended hearings in a federal court re-
ceivership in which the rental values of certain business properties were
shown by expert testimony to have depreciated much more than 50 per
cent since the execution, in 1929 and 1930, of the leases disaffirmed by
the receiver.
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a fraction of what it would be if the landlord's claim were not
allowed in the full measure to which the Oldfield case would entitle
him. The implication of such a situation had apparently not oc-
curred to Judge Tuttle in Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., supra, for he
said in his first decision on this case
"For the reasons stated, I reach the conclusion that
these lessors are entitled to recover their damages resulting
from the anticipatory breach of the leases on which their
claims are based, and the contention of the receiver to
the contrary must be overruled. As the argument of the
receiver with respect to these claims has been confined
to the question of their provability, and it does not appear
that there is, or will be, any dispute between the receiver
and the claimants concerning the proper measure or
amount of the damages recoverable, I shall assume, until
the contrary appears, that the interested parties will be
able to agree on the amount of such damages, and that
it will not be necessary for this court to determine such
amount."
3 3
The assumption proved to be wrong, for the case was again
before the same judge in March of 1932. The court for the first
time faced the problem of applying the measure of damages estab-
lished in his preceding decision to a lease with an unexpired term
of twenty years, and confronted, too, the depreciation of rental
values between 1929 and 1931, a depreciation according to expert
witnesses, of 25% to 30% After considering the evidence and
the estimates of real estate experts as to the rental value of the
premises for the unexpired term of the lease (which in the absence
of a bona fide lease for the full balance of the term is the only
proof obtainable), the court said
"Evidence of the fair rental value of a lease on premises
for a period extending eighteen years into the future does
not, especially during the present period of abnormally
low values of which this court will take judicial notice,34
indicate the fair rental value of such premises during such
future period of eighteen years, if leased for periods of
less than that duration, as it would mamfestly be the duty
of the lessor to do if reasonably possible, and as this rec-
ord wholly fails to show is impossible or improbable.
Clearly, the evidence falls far short of meeting the burden,
resting upon the claimant lessor, of proving, with the cer-
tainty required by law, the amount of the damages suf-
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,The United States Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the
depression in an interstate commerce rate case: Atchison & S. F R. Co.
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fered by him and recoverable under the applicable mea-
sure of damages already mentioned.' 85
Strictly speaking, if this conclusion were correct, the claimant
would take nothing, but the court concludes
" I * in -iew of the equities of the parties of which
this court may properly take cognizance in this equitable
proceeding, concluded that the rights of all parties con-
cerned will be properly protected by an allowance to the
claimant lessor of the sum of $7,500 as representing an
amount which will fairly compensate him for all of Ins
damages reasonably to be anticipated as a result of the
breach of this lease by the lessee defendant here." 8 6
Seldom has a retreat to "the equities of the parties" been more
understandable. The court had only one of two possible courses to
follow, between which there is no logical medium ground. (1) It
could apply the correct measure of damages, accept the opimon of
experts as to the value of the unexpired term, and allow damages
in full for the difference between that value and the rent reserved
m the lease, thus swelling the landlord's share of the pro rata dis-
tribution to the very great prejudice of general creditors, or (2)
It could disallow the claim on the ground that damages were not
proved with sufficient certainty, to the great prejudice of the
landlord. Impaled upon its former decision, the court could not
take the latter course. In view of "the equities of the parties" it
could not take the former. Perhaps, after all, the decision lies
within the ancient jurisdiction of Equity defined by Aristotle as
the "correction of the law, where by reason of its umversality, it is
deficient."
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